Author: Xinwei, Severin
As an emerging technology, decentralized sorter aims to optimize the transaction sorting process of the blockchain network in a decentralized manner to improve transactions. efficiency, reduce costs, and solve MEV problems at the same time. The development of this technology marks a further step in the blockchain field’s pursuit of higher performance and greater decentralization.
Metis' "self-operated store" model and Espresso's "outsourcing module" approach demonstrate the construction and maintenance of a decentralized sorter of the two main paths. The former emphasizes the security and stability of internal management and operations, while the latter provides more flexibility and openness, promotes technical versatility and reduces operational burdens.
The development of decentralized sorters heralds the potential of blockchain technology in network security, censorship resistance, transaction efficiency and cost, and potential advances in ecosystem diversity and interoperability. Further optimization and innovation of these technologies, such as batch processing and state channels, will improve the performance of the L2 platform, reduce user costs, and promote the formation of a more open and interconnected decentralized ecosystem.
Although the decentralized sorter faces challenges such as technical implementation, network performance optimization, and governance model design, it is building a more efficient , the key role in a safer and more open decentralized world cannot be underestimated. Future development will likely focus on researching more efficient consensus mechanisms, scalable network architectures, and developing user-friendly interfaces and tools to meet growing market demands and user expectations.
The sorter is just as the name implies. Sort the originally unordered transaction data in the blockchain to organize it into ordered block data for execution. Every L1 blockchain has its own ordering system, but for L2, centralized orderers have become a growing problem.
For L2, the sorter is not necessary. L2 can also choose a sequencer that will use L1. However, due to cost and speed considerations, L2 running its own sequencer can bring users a cheaper and more convenient user experience. L2 runs its own sequencer that can compress hundreds or thousands of L2 transactions into a single L1 transaction and submit it to L1, thereby significantly saving gas costs. Moreover, users can enjoy the fast soft confirmation experience provided by the L2 sequencer without being restricted by Ethereum transaction throughput. Therefore, for L2, running its own sorter is also an inevitable choice to improve user interaction experience.
Although L2 running its own sorter can be improved very well User experience, but nowadays, the centralization of L2 sorter has become a problem that cannot be ignored. Today, the locked position of Ethereum L2 has reached 22B, and massive L2s are constantly emerging. However, almost all L2 sequencers are centralized, and L2 relies on a single sequencer to determine the ordering of all transactions on L2. Centralized sorters face many problems. For example, a single sorter theoretically has the right not to include user transactions, a single sorter can extract MEV from transactions without restrictions, and a single sorter also faces censorship resistance issues. , and a single sequencer will also face the risk of a single point of failure.
source:https://l2beat.com/scaling/summary
In solving the complex challenges of MEV, rollup faces a delicate balance between maintaining user protection and profitability. This challenge involves how to prevent harmful MEV behaviors such as front-loading and sandwich attacks, while efficiently utilizing block space to realize benefits. Although rollups have traditionally protected users from MEV by relying on a single operator model and adopting a first-in-first-out (FIFO) order, this approach may miss revenue opportunities in block space and ignore the economic dynamics that promote rollup stability and growth. important role in. At the same time, ensuring compliance with FIFO principles and maintaining transparency in block ordering also poses additional operational challenges. Additionally, utilizing the underlying block space as a revenue stream, while beneficial, also raises trust issues among users, who must trust that operators will not exploit this space to their detriment through means such as sandwich attacks, which may erode Transaction integrity and user trust.
The shared sequencer provides an innovative solution to deal with the MEV problem by introducing a more secure and fair transaction ordering mechanism in the blockchain network , especially for Ethereum’s second-layer solutions such as rollup, bring significant benefits. It effectively balances the needs and interests of network participants by dividing the rollup's block space into a top block space that protects user transactions and a bottom block space that allows builders to leverage MEV. Using Practical Verifiable Delay Encryption (PVDE) technology, the shared sequencer ensures that user transactions are invisible to malicious actors, preventing harmful MEV practices such as transaction fronting and sandwich attacks. Additionally, by allowing beneficial MEV activity in the bottom block space, the shared orderer generates revenue for rollups while maintaining the integrity of the network and user trust. This mechanism not only improves the security and fairness of transactions, but also supports the sustainable development of the blockchain network through innovative revenue generation methods. In short, Shared Orderer brings positive changes to the blockchain ecosystem through its unique approach to MEV, achieving a balance between protecting user interests and promoting the healthy development of the network.
In general, the problem of centralized sorters still comes from the power and risk exposure of a sorter composed of a single node, while a sequencer composed of multiple nodes has too much power and risk exposure. Decentralized sorters can well solve the problems faced by centralized sorters. The decentralized sorter can ensure the robustness and effectiveness of L2 sorting while also bringing some additional benefits. For example, decentralized sorters represented by Metis can further empower tokens and achieve revenue dividends. Shared sorters eliminate the need for L2 to build its own sorting network, and can also provide more convenient interaction for multiple L2s sharing sorters. Operability. In the long term, the wave of modularization and L2 will definitely promote the decentralization of sorters, and there is still huge market space for the decentralized sorter market.
source:https://joncharbonneau.substack.com/p/rollups-arent -real
Elena Sinelnikova, co-founder and CEO of Metis, has been committed to education and evangelism in the blockchain industry. She is the co-founder of CryptoChicks, an educational non-profit organization. It is currently the largest female blockchain community in the world, with members spread across 56 countries. Kevin Liu is the co-founder and product leader of Metis and the co-founder and CEO of ZKM. Kevin is also an active researcher in token economics, DAO, DeFi and blockchain governance.
Metis is the first Ethereum L2 to propose and test a decentralized sorter.
Metis changes the original single sorter node into a sorter pool composed of many nodes, and realizes the decentralization of the sorter through a random rotation mechanism.
First of all, there will be an Admin role in Metis' decentralized sorter network. Admin's accusation is to manage the decentralized sequencer system, including adding sequencer nodes that meet the requirements to the Sequencer List whitelist, setting the pledge limit of a single node, the release speed of block rewards, etc.
Subsequently, Metis introduced the node staking mechanism. Any node that pledges 20,000 METIS tokens can become one of the nodes in the sequencer pool. Nodes in the sorter pool have the right to see the contents of the transaction pool, and the selected sorter node has the right to package transactions.
Secondly, Metis introduces the PoS node rotation mechanism. Metis randomly selects block producers based on the pledge amount of each node and the random drop of hash values. The selected sequencer node can package block transactions.
Subsequently, the packaged transaction batch needs to be signed by at least 2/3 of the sequencers before the batch will be considered valid and submitted to L1. . The key signed by the sequencer node is managed by the PoS consensus layer of Metis. The consensus layer will generate multi-signature keys and distribute them at the shard level when the sequencer node joins or exits the network.
Finally, in order to prevent the sequencer from doing evil, Metis will also introduce the role of a validator to randomly sample blocks and check whether the order of transactions in the block is correct, etc. wait. Nodes that do malicious things will be punished by having their pledged funds confiscated.
source: https://www.metis.io/decentralized-sequencer
Based on the above process, Metis was able to build a decentralized sequencer architecture based on PoS network consensus. Staking 20,000 METIS can become a sorter node, making the sorter nodes more diverse and avoiding single points of failure, single point manipulation and malicious MEV extraction of the sorter nodes. The node rotation mechanism and multi-signature confirmation make the selection of sorter nodes fairer, and can also prevent sorter nodes from doing evil to a certain extent. The validators’ sampling inspections and slashing penalties can also further reduce the risks caused by malicious behavior of nodes.
In order to further encourage more nodes to participate in Metis’ decentralized sorter network, Metis has also introduced additional incentive mechanisms. After the sequencer node successfully generates a block, it will not only obtain the gas income of the original sequencer, but also obtain additional METIS token emission rewards. Metis’ incentive structure has the potential to create a positive growth flywheel. The boom in transaction activity on the Metis network will lead to an increase in the revenue of the sequencer nodes. The increase in sorter node income will attract more users to stake METIS, become sorter nodes, and capture the sorter income. The decrease in METIS in circulation and the increased demand for METIS generated by staking will further increase the market price of METIS. The increase in the price of METIS will in turn increase the value of the assets of the staking nodes and the staking rewards, thereby creating a greater attraction for the nodes and attracting more nodes to pledge, forming a closed flywheel loop.
Metis’ PoS decentralized sorter network is L2’s first attempt to implement a decentralized sorter. The implementation of the Metis decentralized sorter is expected to drive other L2s to advance their decentralization plans for their sorters.
Espresso’s team has a very luxurious background. Co-founders Charles Lu and Ben Fisch holds a PhD in computer science from Stanford University, and team members have also worked for leading Web2 and Web3 companies such as Binance Labs, Coinbase, and Google. Previously, Espresso also successfully received US$23 million in financing from top venture capital institutions such as Sequoia Capital, Coinbase Ventures, Polychain, and Robot Ventures.
Espresso is positioned as the middleware between L1 and L2, decoupling sorting and execution, and aims to become a decentralized shared sorter network for different L2 provides a decentralized sorter service. Similar to DA outsourcing in the modular concept, the services provided by Espresso are more like transaction data sorting outsourcing services. Like DA outsourcing, the sorting outsourcing service provided by Espresso is also independent of chains and virtual machines. Any type of L2 can use Espresso's sorting service.
source: https://hackmd.io/@EspressoSystems/EspressoSequencer
The core idea of Espresso is to provide a set of modular sorter middleware for L2. After the user sends transaction data through the client, the transaction data will be sent to Espresso's sorter network by L2 along with the L2 identifier. Espresso's nodes (nodes of the Espresso Hotshot proof-of-stake system) will sort the transactions. After the sorting is completed, Broadcast to subscribers (L2 nodes). Subsequently, L2 executes based on the packaged sequenced transaction data. At the same time, Espresso will also submit the block commitment containing the transaction to the L1 sequencer contract. Finally, L2 needs to send the new state to L1, and L1's Rollup contract will use the block commitment from Espresso to verify the state update submitted by L2 to ensure the correctness of execution.
In the future, Espresso also plans to reuse Ethereum's existing verification nodes to participate in sorting through Eigenlayer to achieve higher security.
Generally speaking, Espresso's decentralized sorter solution is more in line with the concept of modular blockchain. Through sorting outsourcing, it uses its own Some PoS networks implement decentralized sorting, forming a decentralized sorter network middleware between L1 and L2. Espresso's universal ordering service enables it to become a shared orderer network, and any L2 can use Espresso's orderer service. Going a step further, L2s that share Espresso as their sequencer provider can enjoy even more seamless interoperability.
Astria CEO Josh Bowen is the biggest promoter of the project. Josh Bowen previously worked at Edge & Node, the startup behind The Graph, and Celestia Labs. His past work experience gave him a deeper understanding of concepts such as modularization and decentralization. He has repeatedly shared important insights into the role of shared orderers in keeping the blockchain space fast and decentralized. Bowen emphasized that most application-specific Rollups may not require their own sequencers, and cultivating a more decentralized, modular network of shared sequencers would be conducive to building a more decentralized and efficient blockchain system. Josh Bowen and Astria's concept has also received support from the likes of Maven 11, 1kx, Delphi Ventures and Figment Capital, from which it raised $5.5 million in seed funding.
Similar to Espresso, Astria aims to provide a decentralized network of shared sequencers. Astria’s Shared Orderer Network is a middleware blockchain with its own set of decentralized orderers that can accept transaction data from multiple L2s. Likewise, Astria can handle any type of L2 sorting request. Furthermore, L2 that also uses Astria can also enjoy the atomic-level interoperability provided by Astria.
Astria’s sorting process is shown in the figure below.
After the user submits the transaction, L2 submits the transaction data to Astria through the interface. A
stria's shared sequencer will reach consensus on transaction ordering and package it into blocks through the ComeBFT PoS consensus network. Astria’s shared orderer network uses CometBFT as its consensus algorithm. During the network consensus phase, the proposer determines the transactions for the block and creates a commitment to the rollup's sequenced data for each rollup. Subsequently, other nodes in the network need to verify and reach consensus to form a final decision.
After the transaction data is sorted, Astria's Conductor will parse the data required by different Rollups for each sequenced block. data, and verify the batch of data, including verifying whether the block has been finalized, whether the extracted Rollup data is complete, correct, and correctly sorted, etc. After verification is completed, Conductor will convert Rollup's sequenced data into a transaction list and pass it to Rollup's execution engine for execution.
L2 that pursues a faster user experience can read The interface accepts soft commit sequenced blocks from Astria to provide users with fast block confirmation. L2 can also read the sequenced blocks of hard commits written by Astria through the DA layer.
Astria's decentralized sequencer network is very similar to Espresso's solution, both are dedicated to serving arbitrary L2 Provides decoupled decentralized sorting service. L2 can further simplify L2's development process and operating costs by outsourcing ordering services and enjoy atomic-level composability between L2s.
Radius focuses on developing a trustless shared sorting layer, aiming to solve Harmful MEV extraction and censorship challenges in the blockchain space. Radius has successfully raised $1.7 million from investors such as Hashed, Superscrypt, Lambdaclass (Ergodic Fund) and Crypto.com pre-seed round of financing.
Radius also aims to build a trustless, censorship-resistant shared sorter network, and compared to Espresso and Astria, the biggest feature of Radius is that it can pass encryption Memory pool effectively reduces harmful MEV.
The overall architecture of the Radius shared sequencer network is similar to the mainstream shared sequencer network. Users submit encrypted transaction data and proofs to the sequencer layer through Dapps. The sorter verifies the transaction data and proofs provided by the user and packages them for sorting. Subsequently, Rollup accepts the sequenced blocks from the sequencer network, executes the transactions in order, and submits the executed status and status certificate to the settlement layer.
Interestingly, Radius introduced encrypted memory pools to prevent the sorter from extracting harmful MEVs. Transactions submitted by users are encrypted and submitted to the sequencer network in the form of encrypted data. The sorter cannot obtain the key when sorting transactions and cannot decrypt and view the specific content of each transaction. Therefore, the sorter cannot extract MEV by maliciously sorting and inserting transactions.
Radius divides the block space into top space and bottom space. The headspace is dedicated to user transactions, effectively avoiding harmful MEV by encrypting the memory pool. The bottom space introduces an auction-based open market for traders, where cross-rollup benign MEV bundled transactions can be created, such as benign arbitrage, liquidation, etc. Subsequently, traders submit bundled transactions and bids to the sorter, and the sorter selects the bundled transaction with the highest bid and includes it in the block, thereby maximizing Rollup profits and cultivating a healthy MEV competition market.
Comparing Espresso and Astria, Radius has two significant advantages. First, by introducing an encrypted memory pool and dividing the block space into top space and bottom space, Radius can effectively eliminate harmful MEV transactions, cultivate a healthy MEV competition market, and maximize Rollup's profits. Second, the introduction of the encrypted memory pool makes it impossible for a single sorter node to do evil through MEV. Therefore, there is no need to introduce an additional consensus mechanism to ensure the correctness of sorting, which can greatly improve the final confirmation speed and scalability of the sorter network.
SUAVE solution was proposed by the Flashbots team. Flashbots is a pioneering team dedicated to solving the MEV problem in the Ethereum ecosystem. It is composed of a group of professionals with deep backgrounds in multiple fields such as computer science, mathematics, psychology, and economics. According to LinkedIn, the team currently includes 28 employees whose expertise ranges from Python programming, blockchain technology, machine learning to the C language.
Flashbots' founding team includes Philip Daian and Stephane Gosselin, who left in October 2022 over differences with the team over censorship. Additionally, Alex Obadia, another co-founder and top strategy researcher, left Flashbots in June 2023 for personal reasons. Core members include Andrew Miller, known for his work on breaking Intel's SGX code and currently serving as research director for Trusted Execution Environments and SUAVE. Miller plans to take a break from his position as an assistant professor at the University of Illinois, where his work in academia focuses on electrical and computer engineering. Hasu, another core member, serves as head of strategy at Flashbots and has extensive influence in the blockchain space, including serving as a strategic advisor to liquidity staking protocol Lido and a research collaborator at Paradigm Investments. Hasu is dedicated to promoting industry growth and education through writing, social media, and podcasts.
SUAVE is a unique decentralized builder and sorter that is significantly different from other shared or sorting layer designs. It is designed to provide transaction ordering services for Ethereum and other blockchains, but is not directly embedded into any chain's protocol. Users can send transactions to SUAVE’s cryptographic memory pool, while SUAVE’s network of executors is responsible for outputting blocks or partial blocks for the chain. These blocks will compete with blocks generated by traditional centralized Ethereum builders, chosen by Ethereum proposers.
SUAVE does not replace Rollup's block selection mechanism, nor does it change the chain's fork selection rules. It focuses on ordering that provides optimal profits for any chain, often having full states to simulate the outcomes of different transactions and create optimal ordering. This design allows SUAVE to collaborate with shared orderers or other MEV-aware builders to provide services such as atomic cross-chain arbitrage, ensuring that several transactions are executed atomically or canceled simultaneously.
In the long run, Rollup may be a better choice. Rollup ensures its security, censorship resistance, and activity through L1, while SUAVE, as a chain focused on transaction ordering, is not suitable for ordinary users. Its goal is to limit the need for users to bridge funds to SUAVE, and instead focuses on providing searchers with /Builder provides an operating platform. SUAVE focuses on providing the most advantageous ordering for transactions, rather than completely replacing existing ordering mechanisms. It can process fully stateful transactions to create optimal transaction ordering.
Concerning the handling of MEV, there are several mechanisms to reduce potential contention and negative externalities associated with transaction ordering and inclusion. For example, Arbitrum's time boosting mechanism and the FBA-FCFS model proposed by Flashbots both attempt to reduce the incentive to compete for latency by allowing users to express their preference for fast inclusion transactions through fees.
Arbitrum's time promotion mechanism
The time promotion mechanism is a security measure for Protects against a specific type of attack called a Time Bandit Attack. In this attack, the attacker might try to reorganize already confirmed blocks to profit from some previously unknown information (e.g., knowledge of a transaction that was exploited after the fact).
Arbitrum defends against this attack through a unique mechanism that allows anyone to submit a "challenge" if they notice someone attempting a time bandit attack. Prove the attacker’s actions. This mechanism is based on an economic incentive to ensure that the potential benefits of attackers are offset, thereby protecting the security and fairness of the network.
FBA-FCFS model of Flashbots
FBA-FCFS (First Bid Auction - First Come , First Served) model is a transaction sorting mechanism proposed by Flashbots. The purpose of this model is to solve traditional transaction selection and ranking problems, especially in MEV extraction environments.
The First Bid Auction (FBA) section means traders can bid (usually pay An additional fee given to miners) to prioritize their transactions. This is similar to an auction, with the highest bidder getting first dibs.
First Come, First Served (FCFS) means that under certain conditions, transactions will be processed in the order they were submitted. Ensure fairness and transparency.
The FBA-FCFS model attempts to balance fairness and efficiency, optimizing the use of network resources by allowing bidding on transactions while Ensure that certain users are not completely excluded due to lack of ability to pay.
These mechanisms each have their own advantages and disadvantages, but the common goal is to improve the efficiency and fairness of transaction processing.
By partnering with Rollup and other MEV-aware builders, SUAVE aims to provide greater economic security and efficiency for cross-chain operations while exploring new The economic security model and MEV mitigation mechanism improve the decentralization of blockchain transaction ordering and execution.
Metis, Astria, Espresso, Radius, and SUAVE projects Each has its own focus, but the common focus is on improving the scalability and transaction efficiency of the blockchain, while solving the MEV problem and enhancing the decentralization and interoperability of the system.
Metis focuses on optimizing Ethereum’s transaction processing capabilities to reduce costs and increase efficiency through its Layer 2 solutions, aiming to provide developers and enterprises with A more convenient development platform. Astria and Espresso proposed the concept of a decentralized shared sequencer network to support transaction data processing of multiple Layer 2 solutions. This not only simplifies the development and operation process, but also strengthens the composability and interoperability between systems. sex. The Radius project is committed to creating a trustless, censorship-resistant network by introducing encrypted memory pools and block space partitioning, aiming to reduce the harmful effects of MEV while improving the privacy and security of transactions. SUAVE focuses on solving the impact of MEV on transaction fairness and transparency through a decentralized sequencer network, demonstrating its commitment to improving the fairness of the trading environment.
When exploring the development direction of decentralized sorters, Metis and Espresso provide two completely different models, namely the "self-operated store" model and The “outsourced module” approach. The two models each reflect the community’s different thinking and strategies on how to build and maintain decentralized orderers.
The "self-operated store" model adopted by Metis emphasizes the internal management and operation of its decentralized sorter network to ensure the security and safety of the network. stability. This approach allows Metis to directly control the nodes within its network and maintain a healthy network environment through staking and incentive mechanisms. Although this model can improve the security and reliability of the network, it also requires Metis to assume greater operational responsibilities and resource investment, which may limit the flexibility and scalability of the network to a certain extent.
In contrast, the "outsourcing module" approach adopted by Espresso provides a more flexible and open solution. By allowing any blockchain project to access its ordering service, Espresso promotes the versatility and diversity of technology while also reducing the operational burden on individual projects. The challenge with this model is that it may introduce additional trust issues, as project parties need to rely on Espresso to process transactions in a fair and secure manner. Additionally, any issues or attacks against Espresso's services could have an impact on a wide range of customer projects.
Metis's "self-operated store" model and Espresso's "outsourced module" approach demonstrate the two main development paths in the field of decentralized sorters. Each model has its own unique advantages and challenges, and which one to choose depends on the specific needs of the project, its resource situation, and the emphasis on decentralization and security.
The development prospects of decentralized sorters indicate that blockchain technology can improve network security, enhance anti-censorship capabilities, improve transaction efficiency, reduce costs, and promote the ecology Huge potential for system diversity and interoperability. With the continuous advancement of decentralized sorter technology, we can foresee a more secure and efficient blockchain network, in which the decentralized sorting mechanism can effectively defend against single points of failure and malicious attacks, and protect the security of user assets and data. . In addition, the optimization and innovation of decentralized sequencers, such as batch processing and status channels, will further improve the transaction processing capabilities of the L2 platform, reduce user transaction costs, and achieve high throughput and low-latency transaction confirmation, thereby eliminating the need to sacrifice Improve user experience on the basis of security and decentralization.
At the same time, the popularity of decentralized sorters is expected to promote the formation of a more diverse and interoperable blockchain ecosystem. Shared sequencer networks, such as Espresso and Astria, will not only provide services for multiple L2 platforms, but also facilitate the flow of data and assets between different platforms, creating a more open and connected decentralized world. In addition, innovations in incentive mechanisms and token economic models will provide reasonable incentives for participants in the decentralized sorter network, while achieving network governance and income distribution through the token economic model, attracting more participants and stimulating community vitality.
Although decentralized sorters have a bright future, they still face challenges in technical implementation, network performance optimization, governance model design, etc. Therefore, future development directions may focus on researching more efficient consensus mechanisms, exploring scalable network architectures, and developing user-friendly interfaces and tools to meet the growth of market demand and user expectations. In short, the decentralized sequencer is one of the key factors in promoting the development of blockchain technology and applications, and its future evolution will play a vital role in building a more efficient, secure, and open decentralized world.
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