The stablecoin business is a proven one. Following robust policy support and media hype, stablecoins have become even more legendary. In the eyes of most, simply issuing a dollar-pegged digital currency on a blockchain, then leveraging economies of scale to infinitely reduce marginal issuance costs, allows one to earn risk-free interest rates while sitting back and doing nothing. This assertion is both true and false. Essentially, the issuer's business model mirrors the aforementioned assumption: profiting from interest rate differentials, and generating substantial profits. Take Tether, for example. With $170 billion in USDT, its profit margin could reach 99%. In 2024, Tether's net profit reached $13 billion, and in the second quarter of 2025, it saw $4.9 billion. Of this profit, approximately $7 billion came from interest on Treasury bonds and repurchase agreements, accounting for more than half of the total. Tether holds $90.87 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds, representing 82.5% of its total reserves. Looking at all USD stablecoins, 4% is the bottom line for profitability. This figure is comparable to Meituan Waimai's profit margin, and higher than Walmart's 2.39% in fiscal year 2024 and JD.com's 3.6% net profit margin in 2024. Judging by this, it's not an exaggeration to call it passive income. It's precisely for this reason that major companies are vying for the right to mint coins, and on social media, stablecoins have become a savior for low-profit businesses. However, if we only look at the business from a technical and theoretical perspective, it's nothing short of a fantasy. Beyond the most trivial technical architecture, the operation of the entire ecosystem is crucial for issuing a stablecoin. From a compliance perspective, obtaining multiple licenses is no small feat, and the ongoing costs are even more significant. Compliance fees can easily reach tens of millions of dollars, a daunting prospect for startups. Adding to the complexities of fund custody, liquidity reserves, and ongoing operational and maintenance costs, the sums reach tens of millions of dollars. Taking Hong Kong's compliant trading platforms as an example, HashKey licensing fees are rumored to be as high as HK$20-50 million. According to OSL's latest interim financial report, other operating expenses, including consulting, compliance, and insurance, reached HK$65 million. Even if the stablecoin is successfully launched after overcoming numerous difficulties, building demand remains a challenge. This requires channels, use cases, and incentives. However, everything has two sides. Over-reliance on channels can lead to revenue siphoning. While gray areas offer the fastest entry points, they also attract regulatory attention, making it even more difficult to determine the effectiveness of incentives. Incentives can also drive demand away. Overall, while the stablecoin business model is simple, it's actually a complex undertaking. However, this complex undertaking is paired with a rather fragile business model. Since its primary revenue stream is interest rate differentials, stablecoin profits are highly dependent on macroeconomic policy changes—in short, the Federal Reserve's mood. During this prolonged tightening cycle, Treasury bond yields of 4-5% are indeed attractive. However, with the Fed about to embark on a cycle of rate cuts, they face significant challenges.
From the data,the Federal Reserve’s decision to cut interest rates by 25 basis points to 4.00%-4.25% on September 17 has dealt a heavy blow to the revenue of stablecoin issuers. Citing data from Coindesk, by analyzing the collateral holdings of the five major fiat-backed stablecoins, the interest rate cut will reduce the annualized revenue of these issuers by approximately US$500 million in total, of which Tether's potential revenue loss is as high as US$325 million. The analysis assumes that cash and bank deposits accrue interest. Circle’s USDC faces the second-largest potential impact at $160 million, while the smaller USD1, FDUSD, and PYUSD could lose up to $5.53 million, $2.92 million, and $2.53 million, respectively. ... Faced with numerous crises, stablecoin issuers are not to be outdone, and their strategies differ depending on their roles. The recently popular stablecoin chains are a prime example. Shortly after the official announcements of Stable and Tempo, Tether's other stablecoin chain, Plasma, has entered the fast lane. Plasma launched its mainnet Beta version on September 25, 2025, and simultaneously released its native token, XPL, an airdrop that sent shockwaves through the crypto world. Unlike previous airdrops, which have focused on Sybil prevention, Plasma's offerings were truly generous. Not only could users participate in the July presale, but they also received direct rewards. Even small depositors who completed Sonar (by Echo) verification and participated in the sale were included, truly ensuring equal access. Against this backdrop, Plasma, already enjoying the benefits of a strong backing, not only did its stock price decline after its launch, but it actually saw strong growth, with its holdings rapidly exceeding $2 billion, a remarkable achievement for airdrop projects in recent months. The ecosystem has also performed exceptionally well. Deflama data shows that since its mainnet launch on September 25th, as of September 30th, Plasma's total value locked (TVL) has reached nearly $6 billion, with an average daily increase of approximately $1.5 billion over the past four days. In just a few days, it has become the sixth-largest stablecoin blockchain, second only to TRON. Specific price details will not be discussed here; here we will focus on the strategic significance of Tether's launch of a public stablecoin blockchain. The core consideration is the convergence of interests. Tether is the parent company of the giant stablecoin USDT. With USDT alone, at $17.18 billion, it holds 59.45% of the current stablecoin market, essentially leading the stablecoin sector. Similar to other stablecoin companies, Tether's profitability is highly dependent on the risk-free interest rate. Theoretically, USDT, which is driven by scale, has an annual transaction volume of 36.3 trillion, exceeding the combined total of Visa and Mastercard. The transaction fees should be very considerable. However, due to Tether's failure to control payment channels has resulted in a significant portion of its transaction fees being captured by public chains like Tron and Ethereum. Tether's launch of a public stablecoin blockchain is precisely aimed at recovering these transaction fees and further strengthening its control over the stablecoin economy. Against this backdrop, Tether has adopted a dual-track strategy. Plasma targets retail users, providing security through Bitcoin while simultaneously leveraging traditional payment channels and capturing crypto-native returns through DeFi protocols. Stable, on the other hand, focuses on the industrial sector, planning to use USDT as a gas and settlement layer, primarily focusing on trade settlements for enterprises. It can be seen that Tether is moving from being a stablecoin issuer to becoming a global payment infrastructure. Compared to Tether's dividend recovery, Circle's move is to open up new revenue channels. Circle’s revenue vulnerability is higher than other stablecoins because it is highly dependent on cooperation channels. Coinbase alone accounted for $900 million of Circle’s profits, accounting for 54.18% of Circle’s annual revenue. Against this backdrop, although Circle has also launched the public chain Arc to enhance its revenue sources, it is also launching new products at the protocol layer, blockchain infrastructure, developer tools and application layers to enrich its revenue system. It is worth mentioning that it plans to launch the Circle Payments Network. In this product, Circle will connect to global financial institutions through a platform integration model and support real-time cross-border settlement of stablecoins. If this move is successful, Circle can successfully transform its role from issuer to channel. Of course, the giants have collectively taken defensive measures, but for relatively small stablecoin companies, the demand side has not yet been resolved, let alone facing the problem of business model. However, it must be admitted that the stablecoin market is not as safe as imagined. As the Federal Reserve continues to cut interest rates, stress testing is also being launched. Among them, only companies that better understand the nature of the market and act more quickly will survive the great waves.